The report about Hezbollah’s alleged willingness to disarm and transfer its weapons to the Lebanese Army has drawn significant attention, as it ostensibly signals a major strategic shift for the organization. However, an examination of Hezbollah’s declared policy—as well as its actual conduct—suggests that the path to such a move is still very long.
Weakened, defeated, and impoverished by the war, Hezbollah now stands at a crossroads and is struggling to recover under immense pressure from all directions:
- The IDF’s continued military operation against Hezbollah, which, since the implementation of the ceasefire, has carried out hundreds of strikes and eliminated over 100 of the organization’s operatives as part of enforcing the agreement;
- The firm stance of the United States, which backs Israel and demands Hezbollah’s disarmament as a key condition for providing aid toward Lebanon’s post-war recovery and its collapsing economy—as strongly conveyed during the recent visit to Lebanon by the American envoy;
- The rise of a new leadership in Lebanon (president and government), which also supports Hezbollah’s disarmament. This issue appears in the government’s basic policy outline and has sparked wide debate, particularly from Hezbollah’s growing number of opponents in Lebanon;
- Hezbollah’s difficulties in continuing its smuggling operations, due to measures taken by the Lebanese government and security forces to restrict the organization’s freedom of movement, especially in preventing smuggling through Syrian border crossings, by air, and by sea;
- The broader struggles facing the entire Shiite axis, including Iran—particularly the collapse of the Assad regime and the resulting loss of Syria as a base for operations and a corridor for smuggling.
Hezbollah hasn’t yet given up on its “resistance” ideology or its ambitions to regain its strength and resume operations against Israel. However, the intense pressure it faces has led its fractured and weakened leadership to temporarily adapt its strategy and operational methods. The goal is to ease some of the pressure, especially from Israel, and allow the organization to focus on rebuilding its capabilities and infrastructure.
In this context, Hezbollah’s current “willingness” to engage in dialogue with the Lebanese leadership on the issue of weapons should be seen as a short-term tactic, along with placing clear preconditions: Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a halt to its attacks on the organization.
To take advantage of this opportunity to reshape the security reality along the Lebanon border, it’s crucial that Israel maintains military pressure on Hezbollah—in coordination with the United States and as part of implementing the ceasefire agreement. This should be done while considering the internal constraints facing the Lebanese leadership, which is pursuing a cautious policy to avoid violent confrontation with Hezbollah. At the same time, it’s also suggested to clarify that the IDF’s presence at the five strategic points in Lebanese territory is temporary. However, Israel should insist that the IDF will only withdraw after it is assured that Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon has been completely removed and that the Lebanese Army has full control of the area.
The report about Hezbollah’s alleged willingness to disarm and transfer its weapons to the Lebanese Army has drawn significant attention, as it ostensibly signals a major strategic shift for the organization. However, an examination of Hezbollah’s declared policy—as well as its actual conduct—suggests that the path to such a move is still very long.
Weakened, defeated, and impoverished by the war, Hezbollah now stands at a crossroads and is struggling to recover under immense pressure from all directions:
Hezbollah hasn’t yet given up on its “resistance” ideology or its ambitions to regain its strength and resume operations against Israel. However, the intense pressure it faces has led its fractured and weakened leadership to temporarily adapt its strategy and operational methods. The goal is to ease some of the pressure, especially from Israel, and allow the organization to focus on rebuilding its capabilities and infrastructure.
In this context, Hezbollah’s current “willingness” to engage in dialogue with the Lebanese leadership on the issue of weapons should be seen as a short-term tactic, along with placing clear preconditions: Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a halt to its attacks on the organization.
To take advantage of this opportunity to reshape the security reality along the Lebanon border, it’s crucial that Israel maintains military pressure on Hezbollah—in coordination with the United States and as part of implementing the ceasefire agreement. This should be done while considering the internal constraints facing the Lebanese leadership, which is pursuing a cautious policy to avoid violent confrontation with Hezbollah. At the same time, it’s also suggested to clarify that the IDF’s presence at the five strategic points in Lebanese territory is temporary. However, Israel should insist that the IDF will only withdraw after it is assured that Hezbollah’s military presence in southern Lebanon has been completely removed and that the Lebanese Army has full control of the area.