

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY  אוניברסיטת תל-אביב

Bulletin

No. 27 – November 2001

ON THE AGENDA

1 YARIV WING INAUGURATED: JCSS shows off its new facilities, located on the fourth floor of the Gilman Building.

MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE 2000-2001: This year's study finds that Israel's strength is a deterrent to regional conflict.

4 MAY CONFERENCE: STATE OF THE NATION – 2001: Audiences in excess of 600 attended this year's annual Aharon Yariv Memorial Conference.

MEDIA AS AN ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC THINKING – INTIFADA 2000-2001: Standing room only crowds came to hear two former Prime Ministers discuss the importance of the media.

8 FINDINGS OF THE 17th ANNUAL SURVEY: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001.

GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER RUDOLF SCHARPING: "European Security in the 21st Century – Perspectives and Requirements."

10 THE TSHETSHIK PRIZE 2001: This year's prize is shared by four authors.

JAMES RUBIN AT JCSS: The former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State spoke on: "Conflict in the Media: A look at the Middle East Crisis."

12 PUBLICATIONS 1998-2001: A comprehensive list of new publications from the Center. ■

AHARON YARIV WING INAUGURATED



NOA YARIV, GRANDDAUGHTER OF JCSS FOUNDER AHARON YARIV, CUT THE RIBBON OFFICIALLY INAUGURATING THE NEW WING. BEHIND HER IS TAU PRESIDENT, ITAMAR RABINOVICH AND, AT RIGHT, JCSS HEAD SHAI FELDMAN. HER PARENTS, ARZA AND ASSAF YARIV AND GRANDMOTHER, NEHAMA, ARE AT REAR LEFT.

After two years of planning and nine months of construction, the Aharon Yariv Wing of the Gilman Building home of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies was inaugurated on May 18, 2001.

The Friday morning ceremony, timed to coincide with Tel Aviv University's annual Board of Governors' Meeting, was attended by a large number of serving and former defense officials, friends of Yariv, members of his family and

senior members of Tel Aviv University's faculty, including newly elected Rector, Professor Shimon Yankielowicz.

In his opening remarks, TAU President

Continued on page 2

Continued from page 1

Itamar Rabinovich credited Yariv, a former head of Military Intelligence and Cabinet Minister, with having brought a new discipline to Israel by creating the Jaffee Center, one that allowed academics and the practitioners of strategic issues to interact with and understand each other. He noted that the Jaffee Center was the first academic center in Israel devoted to strategic issues with the double mandate of producing basic research – books – and influencing the public debate on strategic issues.

The event that had led Yariv to build the Center, he recalled, was the surprise attack Israel sustained on two fronts in the 1973 War – a miscalculation resulting from Israel's strategic experts being locked in a tunnel of their own thinking. Yariv's idea was to produce research that would test conventional wisdoms and place policy under the scrutiny of an external, interdisciplinary body that would help air alternative viewpoints.

Prof. Shai Feldman, who currently heads JCSS and who began his career as the first young researcher recruited by Yariv to help establish the Center, gave the keynote address, in which he focused on Yariv's legacy.

To that end, Prof. Feldman outlined eight outstanding personal attributes that, taken together, constituted Yariv's legacy: he had a balanced approach to assessing situations; he was modest about success, always aware that those who applaud today could be critical tomorrow; he had the courage to say things he thought were correct even before they were generally accepted, such as proposing to negotiate with the PLO; he was always skeptical, always seeking the true inner logic of any situation; he was extremely self-critical; he was a chronic worrier, never taking Israel's continued survival for granted; he was ready to adjust to new situations; and

he had an inordinate determination and tremendous ability to withstand hardships.

Yariv's strategic legacy to coming generations of intelligence officers and others charged with assessment was a tradition of moderation and balance in understanding and estimating one's rival. He advocated adopting a reciprocal relationship in regard to the Arab States, believing that it was possible to interact with them and not just react to them. He understood that security was a relative quantity and, as has proven extremely relevant in this latest conflict with the Palestinians, that policy makers should always take media and public opinion into account in all phases of policy planning.

The Yariv Wing is located on the fourth floor of the Gilman Building at Tel Aviv University. Wood paneled and built around a central feature displaying a bronze relief of Yariv, the Wing includes the renovated office of the Head of Center, a new central administration and filing area, and a conference room that can seat 22 participants comfortably around a large oval table. ■

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JCSS'S NEWLY REFURBISHED CONFERENCE ROOM.



THE ENTRANCE TO THE CENTER'S NEW WING WITH A BRONZE RELIEF OF YARIV.

MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE 2000-2001


ISRAELI STRATEGIC DOMINANCE: A DETERRENT TO REGIONAL CONFLICT

The strategic balance in the Middle East clearly favors Israel, thus preventing the ongoing violence with the Palestinians from escalating to a regional confrontation. This conclusion rests on the data and analysis provided in the annual Middle East Military Balance 2000-2001, published by the Center in June 2001. This year's volume was written by JCSS Head of Center, Prof. Shai Feldman, and by Yiftah Shapir, a research associate at the Center.

Presenting this year's volume, Prof. Feldman emphasized that "from Israel's standpoint, no significant changes occurred during the past year, in either the conventional or the unconventional realms. In these areas, Israel's deterrent power remained robust, serving as a barrier against escalation to a regional war."

Prof. Feldman noted that in the eyes of the Arab states, the strategic gap favoring Israel continues to widen. This is especially the case in the areas of cutting-edge technologies that are critical to the efficient employment of military forces in the battlefield. Paramount among these are air power, intelligence-gathering systems – including space-based intelligence assets – and ballistic missile defenses. In contrast to the IDF, all Arab armies lag in implementing technologies made available by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) – technologies which allow the realms of command, control, and intelligence to be coordinated for the successful execution of ground, naval and air operations.

"The continuing Palestinian violence presents Israel with a strategic challenge of the highest order," noted Prof. Feldman, "yet the difficulties entailed in addressing this challenge do not erode Israel's overall strategic advantage. This edge results from Israel's superior conventional forces, the Arab states' assessment that Israel



possesses nuclear weapons, the close defense ties between Israel and the United States, and the absence of a substitute for the assistance that the Soviet Union provided some of the Arab states

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during the Cold War. Given this distribution of power, it is in the interest of most Arab states to maintain stability and to

avoid becoming embroiled in a general war against Israel."

Prof. Feldman added: "During the past year, no new contracts were signed for the purchase of arms that might allow the Arab states to change the military balance. Moreover, the Arab states also failed to achieve a breakthrough in the non-conventional realm."

Despite the deterioration of the monitoring and verification regime applied against Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein failed to rebuild the facilities for the production of chemical and nuclear weapons. In Iran, the Shahab-3 – a missile being developed with sufficient range for it to be launched against Israel – has not yet become operational."

Yet Prof. Feldman does not dismiss the danger of regional escalation. "Errors in assessment could lead Syria to permit Hizballah to continue operating against Israeli targets, thus propelling a chain reaction that could result in a general war between Syria and Israel. To date, the Syrian leaders' appreciation of the balance of power has induced them to limit Hizballah activities to a very narrow sector – the Har Dov/Shaba Farms area. But there is no guarantee that the Syrians will always exercise such caution."

Prof. Feldman added that in the future, Israel is likely to face more serious strategic challenges. "The long-term implications of the collapse of the international sanctions and monitoring regime applied against Iraq are considerable. Under these circumstances, it would be far easier for Iraq to produce nuclear and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles. Equally worrisome are the prospects that Iran would be able to develop an infrastructure for a military nuclear program and would succeed in making the 1,300-km range Shahab-3 ballistic missile operational." ■

MAY CONFERENCE MAY CON FERENCE

STATE OF THE NATION - 2001

Audiences in excess of 600 attended this year's annual Aharon Yariv Memorial Conference on the State of the Nation, which took place on May 20.

The 2001 State of the Nation Conference was opened by Professor Shai Feldman, Head of JCSS, with former Mossad Chief Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Hofi paying tribute to Yariv's memory. Yariv, Hofi noted, had sparked a revolution within the military by demanding extremely high standards, particularly on matters concerning staff work. What characterized Yariv, and set an example followed to this day, was the former Head of Military Intelligence's ability to listen seriously to all who had an opinion, regardless of rank. Yariv realized that he could not know everything, and had a healthy measure of self-doubt, knowing that in this world nothing was absolute. Above all, Hofi said, Yariv was a caring human being, one who had a deep respect for the views of others.

The conference was divided into four sessions: Science and Security, The Israel-Palestinian Crisis, a dialogue on how to resolve the crisis and a final session that looked at Israel internally. Speaking at the first session, Maj. Gen. Moshe 'Bogie' Ya'alon, (Deputy Chief of Staff; former OC IDF Intelligence Branch) gave a strategic overview of the region. Ya'alon noted that Syria was at a crossroads: while its leaders did not want a war with Israel at this stage, it was continuing to carry out operations against Israel through proxies like the Hizballah in Lebanon. The Syrians know that they cannot match the IDF's battlefield strength and air superiority. However, they have also observed that, while no Arab army has gone to war with Israel since 1973, its populace has been deeply affected both by terrorism and, during the Gulf War, by the threat of long range missiles from Iraq. Syria has thus come to see Israel as strong militarily, but suffering from domestic and social vulnerabilities. Its strategy of fostering proxy battles against

Israel is intended to exploit these vulnerabilities.

With regard to the Palestinian conflict, the violence initiated by Arafat gave the Palestinian leader several advantages, including uniting the PLO's "inside" and "outside" factions, which had been at odds with one another. He noted that the Palestinians had made extremely effective use of the media and had managed to hide their military actions through shadow organizations. By mid-May, he continued, there had been over 5,000 Palestinian attacks against Israel, with terror being used as a tool to break Israeli domestic resolve and make normal life in the country impossible.

The IDF, Ya'alon continued, had not brought its full force to bear in response to these actions, because of the high degree of civilian involvement in and proximity to the conflict, as well as considerations of both regional stability and Israel's image internationally. He said that the IDF had been fully prepared for this conflict and had predicted, for a variety of reasons, that it would erupt in September 2000. In anticipation of this, the military had prepared a wide range of possible response options, ranging from the use of fighter aircraft to clandestine measures, not all of which had been exercised. The battle, he concluded, would have to be fought on many levels, including the political/diplomatic one.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Brom, a Senior Research Associate at the Jaffee Center, summed up the year that had passed since Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. Brom noted that there were those who believed that the withdrawal had been a mistake, claiming that it had eroded Israel's deterrence and had contributed to violence with the



Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Moshe 'Bogie' Ya'alon addressing the 2001 Yariv memorial conference

Palestinians. At the same time, there were also those who had argued the contrary: that the withdrawal was essentially a success, as evidenced by reduced casualties and fewer confrontations with the Hizballah.

The truth, Brom noted, was somewhere in the middle. Hizballah's motivation to attack Israel had indeed decreased: from thousands of encounters between Hizballah and the IDF in the Lebanese security zone, the year since the withdrawal had witnessed but a few. With that, attacks did not cease completely, both because of the anti-Israel ideology that fuels Hizballah, and because of Iranian and Syrian support for ongoing confrontations with Israel. Syria had an interest in keeping the 'Lebanese ulcer' active, so as to ensure that the Golan Heights would remain on the Israeli public agenda, while Hizballah had domestic-political interests in Lebanon that were served by their anti-Israel activities. The use of the border dispute over the Har Dov/Shaba Farms area was thus nothing more than a pretext; were it to be resolved, Hizballah would likely find another.

Finally, Brom noted that Bashar Assad, the new Syrian leader, had emerged as potentially problematic. Despite hopes to

CONFERENCE MAY CONFERENCE

the contrary, Bashar did not seem to espouse liberal, western values, and his decision-making patterns showed a tendency toward rashness. While Assad did not want an all-out war with Israel, the situation could easily escalate out of control, especially if Hizballah were to attack Israeli civilian targets in the North. To prevent this, Israel had adopted a policy of holding Syria responsible for the actions of its proxy. Overall, Brom concluded, the balance on Israel's withdrawal seemed essentially positive, though the situation remained extremely fluid. (A full account of Brom's speech can be found in article form in the August, 2000 issue of JCSS's quarterly *Strategic Assessment*; (Vol. 4, No. 2), available online at <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/>)

Professor Shai Feldman, JCSS Head, spoke on "The Non-Conventional Threat and Israeli Deterrence." Feldman noted that Syria had some 26 missile launchers, and hundreds of missiles capable of reaching Israel. Syria's chemical and biological programs were quite impressive, but it was not clear how close they were in developing warheads capable of delivering these agents. There were no indications, he noted, of a Syrian nuclear program.

Iran had both chemical and biological capabilities, and there was clear evidence that it was investing in a comprehensive nuclear infrastructure that would include weapons production capabilities. This included scientific training, some it under the cover of the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, as well as work on fissile material production facilities. The Iranians, Feldman noted, faced looming problems in this regard. To date, they had neither centrifuge nor separation facilities, which are complicated to build and difficult to hide. Iran did have a missile capability, including the Shahab-3 with a range of some 1,300 km, which was developed based on North Korean and Russian technologies. With that, Feldman also stressed that the main focus of Iranian efforts was Iraq. While Israel was also a factor, the Iranians were aware of Israel's non-conventional capabilities. Moreover, the Iranian leadership had



A capacity audience attended the 2001 annual Yariv memorial conference: State of the Nation.

generally proven to be strategically responsible.

In Iraq, Saddam had already proven that he could plan and execute weapons projects under a veil of secrecy. Moreover, Iraq's human infrastructure, developed in the framework of the Iraqi pre-Gulf War weapons program, remained intact. Finally, were sanctions to be removed, it would be able to draw on considerable financial resources to fund a rebuilding of facilities for the production of weapons of mass destruction.

Given the general scope of nuclear developments in the region and the growing weakness of international control regimes, Israel should continue with an ambiguous policy of deterrence based on Arab presumptions regarding its nuclear capabilities. Simultaneously, Israel needed to pursue a policy of prevention while simultaneously developing both active defense capabilities (such as the Arrow missile) and passive ones (such as the distribution of gas masks, the developing of vaccines, etc.). At the same time, Israel needed to preserve the offensive means needed to enhance deterrence, and to deliver an appropriate response should deterrence fail.

Other speakers included Professor Haim Harari, President of the Weizmann Institute of Science, who spoke about the importance of science education as one pillar of Israel's national strength. The answer to the future, he said, was the synthesis of the computer and genetic revolutions. Israel, despite fully a third of its society being denied access to educational opportunities in the sciences, was ideally positioned to meet these opportunities.

Professor Majid al-Haj addressed the problems of the Israeli-Arab community, providing an analysis of its current state and suggesting how the situation could be improved. Former Defense Minister Moshe Arens and former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami expressed differing views over how to resolve the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the final session, former Finance Minister Avraham 'Beige' Shohat, Professor Ruth Gavison of the Hebrew University, and Supreme Court Justice Dorit Beinisch discussed Israel's domestic needs and challenges. Shohat concentrated on the economic dimension; Prof. Gavison spoke on the secular-religious divide, and Justice Beinisch discussed the role of the judicial system in Israeli society. ■

THE MEDIA AS AN ELEMENT OF STRATEGIC THINKING – INTIFADA 2000-2001

Netanyahu, whose talk was entitled “Can Goliath be Popular?” stressed that in order for the country to be able to make its case internationally, its people had to believe that its cause was just. Barak outlined the reasons for the breakdown between the Israelis and Palestinians at Camp David and analyzed what Arafat wanted to achieve by initiating the violence. He said he approved of the Sharon government’s defense policies in general, but went on to advocate a policy of separation from the Palestinians, preferably as a result of an agreement with them. If agreement cannot be reached, he added, Israel should disengage unilaterally while making sure to leave the door for future negotiations open, should the opportunity to discuss final status issues come again. (The full text of Barak’s remarks, entitled “The Role of the Media in Conflict Management: Intifada 2000 – 2001,” can be found on the JCSS home page).

The first session, entitled “Imagery – Its Power and Consequences” opened with a short film of some of the more powerful images of the conflict. Ilana Dayan, one of Israel’s most respected television journalists, spoke on the “Power of the Image.” Charles Enderlin, Jerusalem Bureau Chief for France-2 television, whose camera crew shot the fateful image of 10-year-old Muhammad a-Dura being killed by Israeli-Palestinian crossfire in Gaza on September 29, spoke on the relations between the Army Spokesman and

On July 9, the Center held an all-day conference entitled “The Media as an Element of Strategy – The Israel-Palestinian Conflict 2000-2001.”

Attended by over 700 people, the conference was unique both in subject matter and in that it hosted two former prime ministers, Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, the latter making his first public appearance since his defeat in the February 6, 2001 elections.



Two former Prime ministers addressed the conference. Binyamin Netanyahu spoke on the subject: ‘Can Goliath be Popular?’. Ehud Barak, seen at right with TAU President Itamar Rabinovich, made the conference his first public appearance after leaving office. Barak spoke on: ‘The Media as an Element of Strategic Thinking.’

the foreign press. Gideon Meir, Deputy Director General of the Foreign Ministry for Communications, outlined how Israel was geared to meet the media challenges it faced.

The second session was devoted to “The Media as an Element of Palestinian Strategic

Thinking” which pitched Itamar Marcus, Director of “Palestinian Media Watch” against Member of Knesset (MK) Dr. Ahmed Tibi. Marcus concentrated on the how the Palestinians have consistently used the media as a vehicle for incitement, while MK Tibi focu-

sed on alleged Israeli injustices during the conflict and how the Israeli media has largely ignored them.

This session was followed by a discussion on “The Media as an Element of Israeli Strategic Thinking.” Mr. Gilad Sher, head of the Prime Minister’s Bureau



From left to right discussing “The Media as an Element of Strategic Thinking” is Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, OC IDF Strategic Planning Branch; Gilad Sher, Head of the Prime Minister’s Bureau under Ehud Barak, and Knesset Member Dr. Ahmed Tibi.

under Ehud Barak, discussed the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating process in great detail and linked the importance of media and diplomacy, using the current conflict as a case

study. Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland (OC IDF Strategic Planning Branch), gave a candid analysis of the objective factors facing the IDF in its conflict with the Palestinians and why, in his

opinion, Israel’s image had suffered in the international press.

The fourth session focused on the “Al-Jazeera phenomenon”, examining how the

the Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies at Tel Aviv University discussed Al-Jazeera’s influence on the Arab world at large.

JCSS Head Shai Feldman des-

***The “Al-Jazeera phenomenon”:
One session examined how
the appearance of the Qatar-based
satellite news network affected the
Arab world, and how its unfiltered
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
appearance of the Qatar-based satellite news network was affecting the Arab world, and how its unfiltered and uncensored messages were affecting strategic thinking. Smadar Peri, veteran Middle East Affairs correspondent for *Yediot Aharonot*, Israel’s largest-selling daily, spoke on how the station was affecting Palestinian media thinking. Dr. Joshua Teitelbaum of

cribed the conference as “an opening shot” in the Center’s plan to launch a research program on the media as an element of strategic thinking. In addition to its record attendance, the conference was widely covered by the print and electronic media, as well as the international Arab press, where it received an inordinate amount of attention. ■

INDYK’S FAREWELL

On July 12, outgoing US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk (center) chose JCSS as the forum for his farewell remarks, after almost six years as US Ambassador. The full text of Ambassador Indyk’s remarks can be found in the August 2001 issue of *Strategic Assessment* (Vol. 4, No. 2). Prior to his lecture, Ambassador Indyk was honored with an award from Tel Aviv University President, Prof. Itamar Rabinovich (left). At right is JCSS Head, Shai Feldman.






In August the Center published the results of its annual public opinion poll on national security affairs (*Israeli Public Opinion on National Security*, Memorandum No. 60, August 2001). The poll was conducted in the framework of the Center's National Security and Public Opinion Project, initiated in 1984. This year's survey was conducted between April 12 and May 11, 2001 with a sample size of 1,216 Jewish citizens of Israel.

Despite eight months of violence, 58 percent expressed their continued support of the Oslo process, compared to 70 percent in both 1999 and 2000. The survey found that 74 percent of Israelis supported a separation from the Palestinians and that 62 percent believed that such a separation was possible. 57 percent of Israelis now approved of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza in the framework of a peace agreement, while 55 percent agreed to the dismantling of settlements outside large settlement blocs. In an unprecedented statistic, 51 percent approved of giving up the non-Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem.


The violence, however, had resulted in a sharp swing to the right in Israel. 38 percent said that violence decreased their willingness to make concessions, and 31 percent claimed it had increased their tendency to vote for right-wing parties. 70 percent said the prospects for peace had diminished and over 60 percent said they opposed an agreement similar to that offered by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David. ■

17TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION ON NATIONAL SECURITY

SUPPORT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE (in %; according to perceived Arab aspirations regarding Israel)



SHIFTS IN ATTITUDE IN REACTION TO INTIFADA, 2001 AND 1998



Key; A: National Mood Worse; B: Assessment of Palestinians more Negative; C: Personal Mood Worse; D: Assessment of Israeli Arabs more Negative; E: Intention to Change Vote to Parties of the Right; F: Lower Desire to Live in Israel.

SUPPORT FOR THE RETURN OF SPECIFIC TERRITORIES, BY AREA

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Western Samaria	30%	30%	38%	44%	39%	41%	51%	39%
Gush Etzion	14%	18%	20%	26%	26%	32%	33%	31%
Jordan Valley	18%	19%	20%	20%	23%	23%	32%	18%
East Jerusalem	10%	9%	12%	20%	17%	21%	24%	51%*

* In 2001, *Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem.*

GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER RUDOLF SCHARPING VISITS JCSS

On December 22, 2000, in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, JCSS hosted German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, who gave a lecture on "European Security in the 21st Century – Perspectives and Requirements." Scharping noted that "lasting peace in the Middle East is of utmost importance, not only in the region but also to Europe's stability and well-being."

While peacemaking may seem impossible in the current climate, he said, escalation and confrontation must not be allowed to gain the upper hand. He said that for both historical and moral reasons, the Israeli people know they can count on Germany's support for the protection of its security. "In the end, however, a solution must be found which accommodates the interests of all the parties involved, for there can be no security without peace."

Scharping then noted that this principle was also central to security and stability in Europe. "Maintaining peace remains the most important objectives of modern security policy in a dynamic strategic environment," he noted. Scharping then outlined three ways in which security policy contributed to maintaining peace: by maintaining the capability to assure the collective defense of all allies, where freedom, rule of law, democracy, a market economy and social responsibility can unfold; by building confidence, to promote arms control, disarmament, and cooperation in the interest of common security; and by building the capability to effectively prevent and respond to crises.

He noted that, as a result of European integration, Europe's contribution to international peace and security was growing. In addition to the Balkan situation, where 39 nations are coopera-



Defense Minister Scharping (left) talking on European Security in the 21st Century. At right is Dr. Mark Heller, JCSS Principle Research Associate.

ting in peacekeeping efforts, the European Union is the largest donor of non-military aid to the Middle East peace process, including a grant of Euro178 million to the Palestinian Authority. ■

STRATEGIC DIALOGUES

ISRAEL-US



In December 2000, the Jaffee Center, together with Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, held the third US-Israel Dialogue on Middle East Security at the Harbortown Resort on Chesapeake Bay. Ten Israelis and 13 Americans, including officials from the incoming Bush Administration, attended the two-and-a-half day meeting. Sessions held included "The October-November Violence: The Strategic Context"; "Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Between War and Negotiation"; "The US and the Peace Process – Lessons from the Recent Past"; "Iraq, Iran and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", and "US-Israel Strategic Ties: Where To?" The meeting was funded by a grant from the Wallis Foundation, arranged with the assistance of Jeffrey Glassman, a member of the Jaffee Center's International Board. ■

JCSS Bulletin

ISRAEL-GERMANY



In June, the Center held its annual dialogue with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik of Germany in Tel Aviv. Co-sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, this year's meeting concentrated on the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians in the European context, and the potential for regional escalation.

Other discussions included a full and frank examination of the problems facing Israel's relations with the Europeans in the shadow of the Israel-Palestinian crisis, the situation in the Gulf with a focus on Iran and Iraq, and the Syrian-Lebanese problem. Maj. Gen. Uzi Dayan, Head of Israel's newly-founded National Security Council, provided an overview of the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while former Government Minister Haim Ramon reflected on what went wrong with the peace process. ■

THE SIRKIN LECTURE

Commander of the Israel Police,
Inspector-General Shlomo Aharonishky


Commander of the Israel Police, Inspector-General Shlomo Aharonishky, on July 19, delivered this year's Shimon Syrikin Lecture. Speaking on "The Challenges Facing the Israeli Police on Internal Security Issues," Inspector-General Aharonishky focused on the priorities facing the police at a time of scarce resources and increased responsibilities.

He also spoke on the special challenges posed by the internal security situation since the current conflict with the Palestinians broke out last September.



NEW JCSS PUBLICATION

Emily Landau, *Egypt and Israel in ACRS: Bilateral Concerns in a Regional Arms Control Process*



The Arms Control project, launched in 1990, focuses on the concept of arms control and its application to the Middle East. The project follows the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as long-range missiles in the region. Initial projects included the first academic conferences on arms control held in the Middle East, and the publication of pioneering studies on related regional arms control issues. These have included in-

depth analyses of the nuclear dimensions of arms control and Israel's nuclear image. Studies on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and Israel's approach to regional and international arms control initiatives were also published.

Recent research has focused specifically on the Arms Control and Regional Security process, initiated in the context of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process in 1992. This culminated in the publication of *Egypt and Israel in ACRS: Bilateral Concerns in a Regional Arms Control Process*, by Emily Landau. ■

EMILY LANDAU

Ms. Landau is director of the Security and Arms Control in the Middle East Project at JCSS. She has published on CSBMs in the Middle East, Arab perceptions of Israel's qualitative edge, Israeli-Egyptian relations, and Israel's arms control policy. Her current research focuses on regional dynamics and processes in the Middle East, particularly the arms control and regional security talks. She is co-author of *Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture* (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994; Hebrew).



TSHETSHIK PRIZE 2001

The Lt. Col. Meir and Rachel Tsetshik Annual Prize for Strategic Studies on Israel's Security was shared by four authors this year. Dan Schueftan of Haifa University and Adv. Dr. Shmuel Berkovits shared the first prize. Dr. Uri Bar-Yosef, also of Haifa University, and Col. (res.) Reuven Erlich of the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzlia, received honorable mentions. The recipients of the shared \$10,000 award were selected from some 20 submissions by a panel of experts coordinated by JCSS, including a number of its senior researchers.

SCHUEFTAN'S book: "*Disengagement – Israel and the Palestinian Entity*", published by Zmora-Bitan Publishers and Haifa University Press, is an in-depth study of the concept of unilateral separation by Israel from the Palestinians, and its consequences.

BERKOVITS' book: "*The Battle for the Holy Places – The Struggle over Jerusalem and the Holy Sites in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District*", was published jointly by the Hed Arzi Publishing House and the Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Israel. The book is considered to be the most comprehensive to date on the subject, documenting the battle over Muslim, Christian and Jewish holy sites from the fourth century to the present.

ERLICH'S book: "*The Lebanon Tangle: The Policy of the Zionist Movement and the State of Israel towards Lebanon – 1918–1958*", was published by the Ministry of Defense Publishing House.

URI BAR-YOSEF'S book: "*The Watchman Who Fell Asleep: The Surprise of the Yom Kippur War and its Sources*" was published by Zmora-Bitan Publishers.

The award ceremony, held on November 1, was followed by a roundtable debate, which focused on the feasibility of a unilaterally-implemented Israeli disengagement from the Palestinians. Moderated by JCSS Head Prof. Shai Feldman, it included among others Tsetchik Prizewinner Dan Schueftan. ■

November 2001

STRATEGIC CROSSROADS



Shortly before the February 2001 elections, JCSS hosted two sessions entitled "Strategic Crossroads," as a public service aimed at allowing representatives from the major political parties to expound on their views at length. The first featured Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami (left), then serving as both



Israel's Foreign Minister and its Public Security Minister, who gave the Labor Party's perspective. The second was with former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (right) who spoke from the Likud's perspective on the challenges facing Israel. Both talks were given to packed audiences. ■

THE TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY

On May 13, 2001 Professor Sidney Drell, Professor-Emeritus of Theoretical Physics at the Sanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University, gave a closed session lecture on the "Technological Aspects of National Security".

In his talk, Professor Drell made a passionate case for continued arms control, noting that nuclear weapons had not been used for 56 years, and that the mutual vulnerability equation enshrined in the concept of MAD (mutually assured destruction) had ended with the passing of the

Cold War. Until that point there had been two themes: deterrence and non-proliferation. Yet the cases of Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated the flaws of the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The only way to make it work, he argued, was to "give it teeth." It is a treaty that has the support of 181 countries, but its importance has grown now that eight countries, including Israel, have nuclear capacities. The 181, he said, have to use their collective power to ensure that the other nuclear-capable countries comply with non-proliferation requirements. ■

JAMES RUBIN, FORMER US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE AT JCSS

James Rubin, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, gave a public lecture at JCSS on June 17, 2001.

Speaking on "Conflict in the Media: A Spokesman Looks at the Middle East Crisis," Rubin told a capacity audience that the real challenge facing spokespeople in an age of instantaneous, global news coverage was "getting the mixed-message theory out to the media" – a message that is essentially consistent with the policies of the government in question, but that is tailored to each specific audience. "There is no magic to spin," he said. "Spin is about substance." Noting that in this day and age "when speed is so intense and the globe so condensed," one has to be able to put out a "total message that leaves nothing hanging in the air." Oversimplification, he added, results in confusion and only serves to complicate the situation. The art is to get a complicated message out clearly with sensitivity to the intended audience. Had the sides emerged from Camp David with a message other than the one of total failure presented at the time, the situation could have ended differently. Instead of admitting failure and blaming Arafat, Rubin said, the message should have been one of historic progress, with more work left to be done. The categorical way in which failure was announced led directly to the current Israel-Palestinian crisis, he contended. "There should have been a fallback strategy that would have allowed the situation to stabilize by preparing messages to deal with failure," he said. He concluded by noting that the media will logically side with the underdog and that there was very little one could do about it. "It's a policy problem, not a media one" he concluded. ■

ABOUT THE JAFFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies was founded in 1977 at the initiative of Tel Aviv University. In 1983 the Center was named the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies – JCSS – in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Mel Jaffee. Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv, former government minister, member of Knesset, and director of Military Intelligence, took upon himself, at the university's request, the organization and management of the Center, and headed it until shortly before his death in 1994.

JCSS initiates and conducts research on a multiplicity of factors – political, military, economic, psychological, sociocultural, etc. – that involve strategic issues. Emphasis is placed on those issues relevant to Israeli national security. In order to safeguard the intellectual freedom of the staff, JCSS maintains a position of non-partisanship on issues of public policy. The opinions expressed in any of the JCSS publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center, its trustees, officers and other staff members, or the organizations and individuals that support its research. Thus the publication of a work by JCSS signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration, but does not imply endorsement of its conclusions or recommendations. ■



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
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A quarterly insight into key security issues
in the Middle East published
in Hebrew and English by JCSS

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